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Introduction
Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly by a resolution1
charged the United Nations Seabed Committee with the responsibility for
serving as the preparatory body for a 1973 Law of the Sea Conference.
The resolution delegated to the U.N. Seabed Committee responsibility for
preparing a list of subjects and issues which, under the terms of Resolution
2750C, "should be dealt with by the Conference."
The Seabed Committee was also charged by that resolution with the task
of preparing draft articles for a future treaty. With this background in mind,
one should examine the results of the four sessions that the Seabed Com-
mittee has undertaken in the past two years. Other than individual treaty
proposals offered by various member states and the usual committee re-
ports, and associated documentation, the only major tangible results of the
past two years' work of the U.N. Seabed Committee are two documents
which the committee agreed upon at its summer 1972 session.
The first is a list of subjects and issues prepared by Subcommittee I1
which should be dealt with by the conference. The list contains 107 issues
and sub-issues which the conferees could discuss. The second document
contains draft texts on seabed principles prepared by a working group of
Subcommittee 1, which presumably would be incorporated in a future
treaty. However, working group members agreed that any draft text con-
tained language that was not necessarily acceptable would be included in
brackets. Consequently, most of the language of the draft principles is
bracketed.
The most positive statement that can be made about the summer 1972
session of the U.N. Seabed Committee is that in contrast to its previous
three sessions, most delegates acted in a businesslike manner in the prepa-
ration of both the draft articles containing the principles and the list of
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issues which might be discussed at the next Law-of-the-Sea Conference.
Those who have attended previous sessions of the U.N. Seabed Com-
mittee could not help but be aware of the polemic tone frequently em-
ployed by many of the delegates.
Name-calling, procedural wrangling and other obstructionisms were
more the rule than the exception. In August 1972, however, most delegates
did get down to business. To their credit, the professionalism exhibited
reflected an increasingly sophisticated knowledge of the subject matter
they were discussing. This knowledge resulted in part from the educational
process of several years of Seabed Committee debates and discussions.
Yet it must be said that in their more professional approach to law of the
sea problem-solving they did not reach agreement on the major issues.
Such agreement, therefore, remains a responsibility yet to be met.
The "Principles" Draft
The truth of this contention may be borne out by returning to the
working group's draft principles. It was originally thought by some that
such a task would be diplomatically easy and rather perfunctory, inasmuch
as the 1970 U.N. General Assembly had already adopted a resolution
(2749 XXV) in a nearly unanimous vote, which contained legal principles
related to the seabed. But such was not to be the case. Notwithstanding the
legal principles resolution, the working group was unable to agree on the
meaning of the individual provisions of Resolution 2749 (XXV). Therefore
its members had great difficulty reaching agreement on how such provi-
sions should be re-formulated for the purpose of inclusion in a seabed
treaty.
The working group completed a first reading or review of all of the texts
of the draft articles. It completed a second reading of the texts II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII, and VIII, leaving texts IX to XXI to be read for the second
time. Yet even after the second reading much was still bracketed.
The entire contents of text I concerning the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, which did not receive a second reading, were not only bracketed
but contained no substance other than indicating the broad areas on which
agreement was needed. Thus, subparagraph 1 merely stated: "Delimitation
of national jurisdiction" while subparagraph 2 simply listed: "Procedures
for notification, record and publication of actual limits of national jurisdic-
tion." In fairness to Subcommittee I, it had been earlier agreed that after
Subcommittees I and 11 considered the issue of the limits of national
jurisdiction, the issue would be negotiated by the full committee. None of
these three bodies has yet reached agreement.
Text 2, captioned "Common heritage of mankind," contains evidence in
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subparagraph I of the long-standing dispute regarding the question of
whether the convention will apply to the "International Seabed" (impliedly
its mineral contents only), or to the entire "area" of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction. Subparagraph 2 reflects disagreement on whether the
resources of the entire water column, or just those of the underlying
seabed, will be included within the scope of the convention. There was
further disagreement as to whether the living resources of the seabed
(sedentary species) should be included and if so, how they would be
defined.
Text 3 combined the texts of the earlier draft texts III and VII. Sub-
paragraph I of Text 3 contained the following language:
All activities in the Area, including scientific research and the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the Area, and other related activities shall be
governed by the provisions of these Articles and shall, unless otherwise
provided in these Articles, be subject to regulation by the Authority estab-
lished.
Subparagraph 2, completely bracketed, defines "activities." Its bracketed
language reveals the yet unresolved issues as to what activities will be
governed by the r6gime, and what will be the scope of the authority of the
international agency established by the r6gime. "Activities" included in the
bracketed text include:
... scientific research, preservation of the marine environment, the pre-
vention of pollution, processing and marketing of commodities recovered
from the Area, accommodation of uses of the Area, conservation of living
resources and the protection of archaeological and historical treasures.
While such details will have to be resolved in the substantive provisions
of the r6gime following the "principles" section, the early bracketing of the
activities to be regulated by the r6gime portends further disputes down the
future negotiating trail.
Text 4, combining texts IV, V and VI of the earlier draft version, is
captioned "Non-appropriation and no claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights..." It provides two alternative formulations on this issue,
which when read in comparison with one another, raise the very important
questions of rights to seabed resources of states not party to the r6gime,
and the rights regarding seabed resources of states party to the r6gime as
against states not party to the r6gime.
One version would prohibit both appropriation of seabed resources and
appropriation of the Area and claim, or exercise of sovereignty or sover-
eign rights to the Area except as specified in the treaty, while the other,
prohibiting such appropriation of the Area and such claim or exercise of
sovereignty or sovereign rights to the Area, would by implication permit
appropriation of seabed resources other than under terms of the treaty.
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Text 5, derived from the earlier draft text VIII, reflects agreement that
.. . the Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all
States, whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination .... "
The remaining texts IX to XXI, which received only one reading, will be
considered again by the working group at its next session. Most members
of the working group concluded their summer 1972 negotiations, with the
common belief that their drafting effort constituted a substantial achieve-
ment. That they agreed to proceed with negotiations in an orderly manner
was indeed an achievement compared to past performances. But the fact
that little of substance in the area of general principles alone was agreed to
during a two-year period following adoption by the U.N. General Assem-
bly of Resolution 2749 XXV, which dealt with essential.ly the same subject
matter, causes one to wonder how long it will take to reach agreement on
alternative formulations of the remainder of the draft treaty texts pertaining
to general principles, let alone the more substantive sections which are to
follow.
The "List"
Further evidence of a lack of progress on reaching agreement on sub-
stantive issues can be found in an examination of the efforts of Subcom-
miteee 11, related to the development of a list of subjects and issues which
could be dealt with by a future conference on the law of the sea.
At the end of the March 1972 session of the Seabed Committee, a
coalition of fifty-six cosponsors, including most developing coastal coun-
tries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and China, Iceland, Rumania,
Spain and Yugoslavia, introduced a draft list of subjects and issues. Its
sponsors presented arguments that the list was objectively compiled, and
fairly represented the interests of all member countries.
However, the delegate of Kenya-one of the sponsors-while referring
to the list, mentioned that:
The existing law of the sea had been designed specifically to favour the
strong countries over weak countries, the industrialized over the poor and the
developed over the developing. The developing countries were therefore
united in their determination to achieve a more balanced and equitable
regime, and that determination was reflected in the list under consideration.
The sponsors were convinced that the list offered a framework in which all
delegations could raise any subject of importance to them at the Conference.
If the Sub-Committee accepted the list on that basis, it could proceed to a
substantive discussion on the subjects and issues at the summer session ....
The sponsors believed that their work fulfilled the mandate entrusted to the
Seabed Committee in resolution 2750C (XXV) to prepare a comprehensive
list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea. The Committee
should proceed expeditiously on the other part of its task, which was to
prepare draft articles on subjects and issues.
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The non-sponsors of the list did not want to proceed to drafting articles
without first seeking to amend the list. They believed, as the statement of
the Kenya delegate implied, that the list catalogued the subjects and issues
in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the developed countries and the
land-locked and shelf-locked countries. Thus, the United States, 3 Italy, 4
the Soviet Union5 and Japan 6 submitted separate amendments to the list
while the land-locked and shelf-locked countries, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia
and Zambia, 7 jointly submitted amendments. The amendments tell the
story of what was felt to be wrong with the list sponsored by the fifty-six.
They merely sought to insure that the conference agenda would contain a
neutral formulation of the issues, in order to prevent an implied forfeiture
of their positions before the substantive discussions began.
Thus, in the summer 1972 session of the U.N. Seabed Committee,
negotiation of the proposed amendments took place. The negotiations were
conducted by a working group followed by adoption of its agreed revisions
by Subcommittee, 1I, and then finally the Full Committee.
The controversial items were as follows:
Item 4 of the list proposed the fifty-six sponsors reads:
4. Straits
4.1 Straits used for international navigation
4.2 Innocent passage
The United States and the Soviet Union had made proposals for a right
of free transit through and over international straits. Nowhere in the list
proposed by the fifty-six sponsors did free transit appear. Thus, the U.S.
amendment called for the addition of sub-item "4.3 Free transit." The
Soviets sought the same end by amending item 4 to delete sub-item 4.2.
The Full Committee, in its summer 1972 session, finally agreed on the
following formulation.
4. Straits used for international navigation
4.1 Innocent passage
4.2 Other related matters, including the question of the right of transit
The above two subparagraphs are clearly contradictory and reveal that the
straits issue in general, and the free transit issue in particular, remain
unresolved.
Item 6 of the list of the original fifty-six sponsors was captioned, "Ex-
clusive economic zone beyond the territorial sea."
The U.S. amendment submitted in March 1972 called for a new caption:
2 A/AC. 138/SC.II/SR. 29 of March 31, 1972, at 6.
3A/AC.138/68, March 29, 1972.4 A/AC.138/69, March 29, 1972.5A/AC.138/70, March 29, 1972.6A/AC.138/71, March 29, 1972.
7A/AC. 138/72, March 29, 1972.
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"Exclusive economic zone or other coastal state economic jurisdiction or
rights beyond the territorial sea." The Japanese amendment would re-
phrase item 6 to read: "Exclusive economic zone or preferential rights of
coastal states beyond the territorial sea." The USSR amendment called for
a reformulation of item 6 to read: "Preferential rights of coastal states
beyond the territorial sea."
The land-locked countries' amendments called for a major overhaul of
item 6 to include, among other things, provision for land-locked and
shelf-locked country participation in development of resources in marine
areas adjacent to coastal states. Additional amendments were suggested
specifically to protect their fisheries interests, and their participation in the
r6gime for the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The final version of item 6 agreed to by the full Committee in August
1972, consisted of two alternative formulations, providing respectively for
an exclusive and non-exclusive resource zone, listed as items 6 and 7.8 The
8They consisted of the following:
6. Exclusive Economic Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea
6. I Nature and Characteristics, Including Rights and Jurisdiction of Coastal States
in Relation to Resources, Pollution Control and Scientific Research in the
Zone. Duties of States
6.2 Resources of the Zone
6.3 Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
6.4 Regional Arrangements
6.5 Limits: Applicable Criteria
6.6 Fisheries
6.6.1 Exclusive Fishery Zone
6.6.2 Preferential Rights of Coastal States
6.6.3 Management and Conservation
6.6.4 Protection of Coastal States' Fisheries in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed
Areas
6.6.5 Regime of Islands Under Foreign Domination and Control in Relation to
Zones of Exclusive Fishing Jurisdiction
6.7 Seabed Within National Jurisdiction
6.7.1 Nature and Characteristics
6.7.2 Delineation Between Adjacent and Opposite States
6.7.3 Sovereign Rights Over Natural Resources
6.7.4 Limits: Applicable Criteria
6.8 Prevention and Control of Pollution and Other Hazards to the Marine Environ-
ment
6.8.1 Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal States
6.9 Scientific Research
7. Coastal State Preferential Rights or Other Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Re-
sources Beyond the Territorial Sea
7. I Nature, Scope and Characteristics
7.2 Seabed Resources
7.3 Fisheries
7.4 Prevention and Control of Pollution and Other Hazards to the Marine Environ-
ment
7.5 International Cooperation in the Study and Rotational Exploitation of Marine
Resources
7.6 Settlement of Disputes
7.7 Other Rights and Obligations
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formulation of item 6 confirms that no agreement had been reached on the
extent of coastal state rights and duties regarding mineral and fishery
resources adjacent to coasts, nor on the breadth of the zone in which such
rights and duties would apply, nor on the correlative rights and duties of
other states in the marine areas adjacent to coastal states. The juxtaposi-
tion of the terms "exclusive" and "preferential," and "rights" and "duties"
reflects the continuing lack of agreement on these issues.
The alternative formulation of the resource jurisdiction issue as item 7
further reflects such differences. Its caption "Coastal State Preferential
Rights and or Other Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction. . ." points up the striking
differences between those advocating exclusive coastal state jurisdiction
over marine resources, and those seeking an equitable international ar-
rangement in which the world community as a whole would benefit, and in
which there would be a balance between coastal state rights and those of
other states having resource development interests in areas adjacent to
coastal states.
Item 7 of the list tabled in March by the original fifty-six sponsors reads:
7. High Seas
7.1 Nature and Characteristics
7.2 Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
7.3 Rights and Duties of States
7.4 Management and Conservation of Living Resources
The U.S. amendment called for a rephrasing of item 7.2 as follows:
"Freedom of Navigation and Overflight and Other Uses." The Soviet
amendment called for the following reformulation of the item: "Freedom of
Navigation and Other Freedoms."
Subcommittee II, at its summer 1972 session, agreed to the following
formulation renumbered as item 8:
8. High Seas
8.1 Nature and Characteristics
8.2 Rights and Duties of States
8.3 Question of the Freedoms of the High Seas and Their Regulation
8.4 Management and Conservation of Living Resources
8.5 Slavery, Piracy, Drugs
8.6 Hot Pursuit
Sub-item 8.3 reveals the continuing differences between those favoring
unrestricted retention of protected high-seas freedoms, and those favoring
their limitation through regulation.
Item 12 of the list tabled in March by the fifty-six sponsors reads:
12. Scientific Research
12.1 Nature, Characteristics, and Objectives of Scientific Research of
the Oceans
12.2 Regulation of Scientific Research
12.3 International Cooperation
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The U.S. amendment called for a new sub-item 2 to read: "12.2 Free-
dom of research and access to scientific information." The Soviet amend-
ment called for a reformulation of the item to read: "Coordination of
scientific research." Both amendments were withdrawn after long dis-
cussion failed to produce a satisfactory rephrasing.
The Working Group, unable to agree on a single neutral formulation,
decided as it had in items 6 and 7 to present alternative formulations as
items 13 and 14:
13. Scientific Research
13.1 Nature, Characteristics and Objectives of Scientific Research of
the Oceans
13.2 Access to Scientific Information
13.3 International Cooperation
14. Development and Transfer of Technology
14.1 Development of Technological Capabilities of Developing Coun-
tries
14.I. I Sharing of Knowledge and Technology Between Developed and
Developing Countries
14.1.2 Training of Personnel from Developing Countries
14.1.3 Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries
Item 13 represented the developed-country view, while item 14 repre-
sented the developing country "transfer of technology" view. This is one
other area of continuing dispute.
Item 21 of the list tabled in March by the original fifty-six sponsors
reads:
2 1. Peaceful Uses of the Ocean Space: Zones of Peace and Security
The U.S. amendment sought to rephrase the item: "Peaceful Uses of
Ocean Space," while the Soviet amendment would have rephrased the item
"Peaceful Uses." The item finally appeared as originally drafted in the list
proposed by the original fifty-six sponsors. Its inclusion in the final agreed
list, however, was by no means a concession on the part of the United
States and USSR, which did not by eventually accepting the item intend to
defer to the wishes of some delegations, that the Seabed Committee ex-
pand its jurisdiction and undertake to resolve disarmament questions.
These were the major issues on which debate was centered in the
Subcommittee 11 working group. The delegates were pleased finally to
have reached agreement on the list. That their approach to negotiations in
the summer 1972 session was more businesslike than in their previous
three sessions, cannot be denied. However, it did take two years to reach
agreement on the list which is merely to serve as a proposed agenda for the
conference. The list is long and cumbersome, duplicative and contradictory
in parts. Although it reveals many of the major areas of disagreement, and
thereby provides a focal point for future negotiations, its drafters were
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careful not to permit its formulation in any way to compromise their
respective national or regional positions, or prejudice their right to take
whatever position they desire on any issue in subsequent discussions.
Summary of the Issues and Positions
In retrospect, when one considers what was contemplated in the 1970
General Assembly resolution calling for a 1973 Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, one must conclude that the timetable for adequate preparatory work
within the Seabed Committee was highly optimistic. Two years later,
comparatively little was actually achieved other than an identification of
issues for future discussions. The negotiations, however, generally revealed
a more sophisticated grasp of the issues.
Although the summer 1972 session represented a quantum jump in the
attitudinal approach of delegates to negotiations, it also revealed that no
consensus was near on most of the major issues. The preceding analyses of
the "principles" draft prepared by Subcommittee l's working group, and
the "list" adopted by the full Committee bear this out. To recapitulate, the
major unresolved issues reflected in these two documents are:
I. The limits of the territorial sea 9 and navigational rights of vessels and
aircraft, in and over international straits which are contained within the
territorial sea of coastal states.
2. The limits of coastal state jurisdiction10 over resources of the seabed
adjacent to and beyond the territorial sea, and the nature and limitations of
coastal state jurisdictional authority in such areas.
3. The nature of fishing rights which coastal countries may obtain in high
seas areas adjacent to their coasts, to regulate the activities of foreign
fishing fleets, the distance from the coastline in which such coastal nation
rights would apply, and the substantive limitations on such coastal country
rights.
4. The measures which coastal countries may take in high seas areas adja-
cent to their coasts, to protect themselves against marine pollution caused
by foreign nations or their nationals, the distance from the coastline in
which such coastal nation rights would apply, and the substantive limita-
tions on such coastal nation rights.
5. The measures which coastal countries may take in high seas areas adja-
cent to their coasts to regulate the conduct by foreign nationals of scien-
9Although not expressly stated in Seabed Committee reports, general agreement did
seem to be emerging that the territorial sea should be limited to twelve miles. But agreement
on this issue by developing coastal states was clearly predicated on the understanding that
their resources interests in areas adjacent to their coasts would be adequately protected.
I°A consensus has begun to develop on a 200-mile limit regarding coastal state resourcesjurisdiction. Coastal states with continental margins extending beyond 200 miles, however,
seem to prefer that their entire continental margins be included within the limits of coastal
state jurisdiction. The limits question, however, remain largely unresolved because of contin-
uing differences over the "mix" of coastal state rights and duties with respect to other states'
rights and duties, regarding resource matters in such areas.
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tific research on the high seas and underlying seabed, the distance from
the coastline in which such coastal country rights would apply, and the
substantive limitations on such coastal country rights.
6. T-he rights of individual countries and their nationals to explore and exploit
the natural resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, the rules and conditions under which such exploration and ex-
ploitation would take place, and the institutional and legal means of
administering such exploration and exploitation, and of disturbing benefits
resulting from such activities, and of resolving disputes arising from such
activities.
To generalize, the major objectives of most developing coastal nations of
the world are to:
1. Extend seawardly the limits of their exclusive jurisdiction and control over
(1) fisheries,
(2) exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals, and
(3) scientific research conducted by foreign vessels in areas adjacent to
their coasts, and in other parts of the high seas;
2. Minimize any restrictions on their exercise of such jurisdiction;
3. Establish an international organization, which they would control. It
would have exclusive authority to explore and exploit the resources of the
seabed beyond the limits of exclusive coastal-nation jurisdiction. It would
control mineral production in this area, and thereby maximize the benefits
therefrom to developing countries. Through control of such an in-
ternational organization, those nations would deny effective commercial
access by the technologically advanced states, to the natural resources of
the seabed lying beyond the limits of exclusive coastal nation jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the objectives of most of the developed countries
with respect to the oceans are to:
Preserve as best they can the largest possible area of the high seas, and
within that area to retain, with minimal restrictions, their rights to exercise
the high seas freedoms (especially the freedom to navigate, fish and conduct
scientific research on the high seas, and to retain their high seas freedom,
subject only to reasonable international regulation, to mine the minerals of the
ocean floor beyond the limits of coastal country jurisdiction.)
The developed countries do not oppose creation of an international
organization to administer the exploration and exploitation of seabed re-
sources beyond the limits of coastal country jurisdiction. But they would
prefer that the organization neither conduct exploration and exploitation of
the resources of the ocean floor, nor control production thereon. The
developed nations would neither restrict opportunities for exploration and
exploitation of the ocean floor by developing countries, no object to paying
a portion of the value of the minerals produced on the ocean floor to an
international organization for the use and benefit of developing countries.
The major exception to these generalities on the objectives of developing
and developed nations, is that land-locked and shelf-locked nations are
generally-opposed to the extension of exclusive coastal-nation jurisdiction
over fisheries and minerals, because they wish to preserve as large an area
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
Political Cobwebs Beneath the Sea
as possible beyond the limits of exclusive national jurisdiction for their own
maximum benefit.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Major Positions
Little progress has been made toward resolution of these issues through
a reconciliation of conflicting views. One means of assessing the relative
strengths of the proponents of the various conflicting positions, is to specu-
late on what would happen should there either not be a Law of the Sea
Conference or should it fail.
Regarding the issue of navigation, merchant vessels of all countries
would undoubtedly continue to sail from port to port through international
straits as necessary. Without such a result international trade would be
slowed to a standstill, with severe disruption of the economies of all
countries-an untenable position for any country to be able to accept.
Insofar as navigational rights for military ships and aircraft are con-
cerned, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have too much of a national
defense stake in the free mobility of their fleets and aircraft, to tolerate any
unilateral prevention of transit through international straits or impediments
to navigation on the high seas. On the other hand, in the interest of
navigational safety it would seem likely that naval policy-makers would be
willing to comply with reasonable ship traffic safety schemes and aircraft
safety regulations, related to straits so long as such schemes did not
prejudice naval mobility.
Regarding coastal state jurisdiction over mineral resources, it can fairly
be said that under the Continental Shelf Doctrine, such rights already
appertain to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the conti-
nental margin. The threat of continuing unilateral assertions of further
control by developing coastal states over fishery resources, absent in-
ternational agreement is a possibility not to be overlooked, notwithstanding
a similar possibility of a retaliatory reaction to such measures by distant
water-fishing states.
Whether most coastal states, developed or developing, have either the
desire or the capability unilaterally to impose and enforce new regulatory
constraints related to pollution prevention and control, and to the conduct
of oceanographic research on the high seas, is subject to some doubt when
consideration is given to other law-of-the-sea objectives expressly ac-
knowledged to be more important.
With respect to the exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep
seabed, it is in the area of the high seas and the deep ocean floor that the
developed nations have the greatest strength: a freedom of the seas tradi-
tion, ships, technology, capital and the option to refuse to ratify-without
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effective developing-nation countersanctions-a r6gime for the deep sea-
bed.
Bearing these considerations in mind, it would seem to be in the interests
of most states to make progress toward international agreement on the law
of the sea issues. Absent agreement, on balance, it would appear that
developing states have more to lose.
However, no hard evidence is yet discernible which points toward a
present willingness on the part of Seabed Committee members to make the
compromises necessary to reach agreement on the host of yet unresolved
issues.
The Seabed Committee as Compared to the
International Law Commission
In fairness to the Seabed Committee, it must be stated that its ap-
proach to problem-solving is substantially different from the International
Law Commission of the 1950s which served as the preparatory
body for the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences. the ILC staff,
composed mainly of international lawyers and technical experts, prepared a
series of draft articles specifically designed to codify existing law, and to
establish new law on a rational, problem-solving basis. Such articles were
drafted and redrafted many times before the politically appointed plenipo-
tentiaries first met to begin negotiations on them.
By contrast, the Seabed Committee is an inherently political body,
whose representatives' skills and inclinations as tacticians and protagon-
ists, often tend to exceed their skills as legal craftsmen and expert tech-
nologists. Notwithstanding these differences, it would seem apparent that
if international agreement within the Seabed Committee on law-of-the-sea
issues is to become a reality, a lessening of the emphasis on the former and
an increase of the latter would be mandatory. Until a common recognition
of these needs is achieved and implemented, progress on reaching in-
ternational agreement may well continue to maintain its present snail's
pace.
Awareness of the absence of substantial progress was recognized this
summer by the members of the Seabed Committee. It became evident to all
that the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference called for by the 1970 General
Assembly resolution would not be practicable. Chile and Austria each
volunteered to serve as host countries for a 1974 Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. The U.N. General Assembly, at its fall 1972 session, called for a
1974 Law of the Sea Conference and charged the Seabed Committee to
continue with its preparatory work in 1973.
Unless members of the Seabed Committee commit themselves to serious
dedication to resolution of conflicting interests during 1973, it may be well
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beyond 1974 before a Law of the Sea Conference can successfully result in
reaching international agreement.
The Moratorium Issue
Another event of note occurred in the March 1972 session of the Seabed
Committee when Kuwait, with the support of thirteen developing nations
and China, attempted to secure approval of a "draft decision" of the
Seabed Committee, to "call upon all states engaged in activities in the
se'abed area beyond national jurisdiction to cease and desist from all com-
mercial activities therein and to refrain from engaging directly or through
their nationals in any operations aimed at the commercial exploitation of
the area before the establishment of the r6gime."
At the summer 1972 session of the Seabed Committee the moratorium
resolution was again raised and discussed in the Committee's report, with
the general understanding that it would be introduced by its sponsors at the
fall 1972 session of the U.N. General Assembly.
As a matter of history, the 1969 General Assembly adopted a morato-
rium resolution which urged that pending the establishment of an in-
ternational r6gime, states and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to
refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the
seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdictions. The United States voted against it and contended
that the resolution was designed to retard the development of the tech-
nological capacity for deep seabed exploitation; that it would encourage
nations to move unilaterally toward unjustifiably expansive claims of na-
tional jurisdiction just in order to remove areas of exploitation from the
scope of the prohibition contained in the resolution; and that adoption of
the resolution would represent a breakdown, on a matter of basic impor-
tance, of those processes of cooperation and consensus which are neces-
sary if any genuine accomplishment is to result from the labors on the
seabed issues in the United Nations.
The United States representative suggested that passage of the resolu-
tion would indicate that the "United Nations were now ... willing to make
fundamental decisions on seabed issues through a 'politics of confrontation'
and paper majorities."
As suggested by the United States representative, the adoption of the
so-called Moratorium Resolution reflected the efforts of a growing number
of nations to engage in the "politics of confrontation." The vote ensuring
its adoption represented a concerted bloc action by developing na-
tions against the developed nations whose interest, in part, is in achieving a
deep seabed r6gime which will be attractive to investors. The vote further
reflected the desire of some developing nations to prevent the tech-
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
14 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
nologically advanced nations from exploiting deep seabed resources until
they could be assured of fully "sharing the benefits" thereof.
A year later the General Assembly adopted another resolution, earlier
mentioned, known as the "Legal Principles" Resolution. It does not tacitly
refer to any prohibition on exploitation, nor does it specifically affirm the
high seas freedom to exploit the deep seabed. The position of the United
States and most other developed countries remains that, under in-
ternational law, there is a present right to exploit the deep seabed, and
indeed prior to establishment of a deep seabed r6gime.
S. 2801, a U.S. Senate bill drafted by the American Mining Congress,
would establish an interim licensing system designed to provide security of
tenure to United States nationals with respect to one another for deep
seabed mining activities. Hearings were held in 1972 in both houses of
Congress on this proposed legislation. The U.S. State Department, at the
time of the hearings, requested the Congress not to take further action on
the legislation until after the fall 1972 session of the U.N. General Assem-
bly.
Legislation providing for an interim system for the regulation of deep-
seabed mining by United States nationals could become a blessing in
disguise. Although an initial negative reaction to it by developing countries
is to be expected, such legislation could be more helpful than harmful to
developing countries.
First, it could stimulate good-faith discussions within the U.N. Seabed
Committee to formulate a seabed regime which would be acceptable to a
broad spectrum of its membership-developing and developed alike.
Second, it could stimulate experimental development of seabed mining
techniques with the attendant benefit of an early accumulation of a body of
working experience and resulting data. Such information could not help but
benefit members of the U.N. Seabed Committee, as they seek to establish
a specific framework to govern future mining efforts on the deep seabed.
If early efforts conducted pursuant to such legislation were successful,
revenues to be used for the benefit of developing countries could be
generated prior to the entry into force of a subsequent regime.
Further, under such legislation mining activities conducted by United
States nationals would be made specifically subject to the r6gime to be
established. Additionally, the legislation could provide a mechanism to
regulate seabed mining efforts prior to the establishment of a regime, and to
limit the area of the seabed in which mining activities would be taking
place-results certainly not to be realized should larger scale seabed min-
ing efforts commence without the enactment of legislation.
A possible benefit to world consumers could also result from such
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legislation, inasmuch as the interim licensing system established could
promote competition between United States seabed mining companies.
With several companies involved in ocean mining, each would most likely
be motivated to develop seabed minerals at competitive costs.
Other interim benefits could also accrue from such legislation, including
the protection of the integrity of investments and, in turn, the growth of
technology without in any way interfering with the existing rights of other
states, to proceed with the development of their own ocean mining capabil-
ity.
Thus, far from being a unilateral act, detrimental and unconducive to
reaching international agreement on a seabed regime, such legislation could
serve as a helpful catalyst for arriving at a timely and widely acceptable
international arrangement for deep ocean mining.
Conclusion
Possible legislation aside, the question remains as to whether a collective
international will to reach a satisfactory resolution of the many disputed
law-of-the-sea issues, may be expected to develop within the U.N. Seabed
Committee in time to enable that Committee to proceed with a sufficiently
comprehensive preparatory effort, to ensure the success of the now sched-
uled 1974 Conference on the Law of the Sea. Some observers of, and
participants in, U.N. Seabed Committee activities, have expressed optim-
ism for such a development. They say that breakthroughs taking the form
of widespread international conciliations are imminent and can be expected
to materialize this year.
Others feel that agreement is a long way off. They state that if it took the
U.N. Seabed Committee two years to reach agreement on only the listing
of issues to be discussed at a future Law of the Sea Conference, and the
translation of fewer than half of the principles contained in Resolution
2749 (XXV) into alternative texts for inclusion in a draft seabed treaty,
then resolution of the plethora of the remaining hotly-disputed issues will
take nearly a decade.
The setbacks for all nations, individually and as representatives of the
international community as a whole, failing timely international agreement
on outstanding law-of-the-sea issues, would be substantial. That U.N.
Seabed Committee members accordingly should proceed earnestly with a
good faith effort to accommodate each other's needs, is beyond dispute. It
is therefore entirely possible that the success or failure of the U.N. Seabed
Committee in resolving the matters before it, may signal whether or not the
United Nations as an institution may be able to continue to play a vital part
in the reconciliation of international problems.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
